Opium and Such

destined for jack bauer's veins


I would like to begin this post by apologizing for the previous two weeks of inactivity. In my defense, I was otherwise occupied for at least some of that time with worthwhile personal pursuits. Or so I thought. In any case, tonight I would like to talk about Afghanistan generally and opium specifically. Although not blessed with many natural resources, the Afghan soil is ideal for the cultivation of poppies, the main ingredient of opium and heroin. Because of this favorable climate, it is unsurprising that when Muhjahadeen warriors in the early 1980’s sought new sources of income, they began to actively encourage the cultivation of this deleterious crop. Opium production quickly became central to the nation’s economy, and under the Taliban had several bumper crops until a 1999 crackdown (purportedly on “religious grounds”, though in practice to ensure high prices on the global market for favored cronies). Once the US invaded in November of 2001, however, the rise in opium cultivation quickly became exponential. In an environment where rule of law can charitably be described as limited and the central government’s reach has often ended at the Kabul city limits, this theoretically illegal crop has flourished. Today, according to CIA estimates, fully 1/3 of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product comes from opium exports.

As of now, stated US, NATO and Afghani policy is to destroy as much of the opium as possible. The result has been violent raids into family and community farms that greatly exacerbate tensions between the people of Afghanistan and their government. Such attacks often leave families destitute and terrified, if not worse. Needless to say, there are few more effective ways to create new Taliban recruits. And at the same time this policy galvanizes hatred against the central government it has barely made a dent in opium production. The issue is simply one of supply, demand, and risk. With the potential profits from opium exceeding by a wide margin anything else a typical farmer could do with his time or resources, and with a “capture rate” made low by rugged terrain and an ill equipped government force, all the incentives structurally draw farmers to keep producing.

Furthermore, once opium is produced, it ends up in very unsavory places. One of the main reasons that the Taliban has been able to experience a resurgence of late has been through its use of opium revenue to buy new equipment and weapons. As long as the production of this crop is below the radar of the government terrorist groups will always be able to exploit it to their advantage. This can be done in several ways, either through agreements for “protection” (aka coercion), to the outright theft of crops. Either way, it seems to be working. And even if global terrorists aren’t getting the money, regionally warlords are. This is important because Afghanistan has never had a tremendous degree of national unity, and by bringing power to the periphery the opium trade as it stands today works to keep the nation apart. No matter how one looks at it, then, the growth of poppies is bad for a stable and unified Afghanistan.

Finally, of course, there are the harms this opium causes when released worldwide. Being addicted to heroin kind of sucks, and this kind of makes it easier.


tee hee hee

So, what’s a lonely superpower and a semi-failed state to do? One possibility is obviously to redouble our efforts at destroying the crop. This is a bad option. In addition to the fact that this will only cost more hearts and minds, such a policy could also prove exorbitantly expensive. Finally, with the war in Iraq showing no signs of abatement, it may not even be militarily possible.

A second possible solution would be for the US or some other group to buy all of Afghanistan’s opium at market value and then destroy or sequester it. Such a policy would certainly have the benefit of no longer angering Afghanis, but it has flaws. Paying full price for all of Afghanistan’s opium is exorbitantly expensive. It seems unlikely that the US (or anyone else) would have the political will to endorse such a tremendous commitment to the state sponsored purchase of narcotics (particularly if no one gets to enjoy them). Additionally, as long as the US must pay full price to everyone, there will always be an incentive to grow more opium. Thus, in the long run, this could lead to a policy that is ever more expensive.

Yet if the first two choices seem bleak, there is another possibility that appears to offer a ray of hope. In a working paper recently published by the Senlis group, a policy proposal was made to allow licensed production of opium. As things stand today, only certain countries (like India) are allowed to grow poppies for legal purposes such as painkillers. Within these nation licensed opium producers are allowed to sell to pharmaceutical companies. By allowing such a program in Afghanistan, the US and other interested groups would have a cost effective way to greatly reduce the problems opium production causes. First, as it turns out there is a worldwide shortage in affordable painkillers, due largely to the high cost of opiate derivatives due to the Byzantine quota system outlined above. In allowing the opium of Afghanistan to be used in painkillers for these people, a tremendous amount of suffering worldwide could be ameliorated. Additionally, opium used in this way would by definition not be going to heroin, which seems good. Because it would be licensed, it would also be taxed, meaning the central government could get back valuable resources. Naturally, this would mean that the Taliban would lose a great deal of financial support, and that warlords would be brought in line. Finally, the fact that no licensed farms would be attacked means both that the farms can pursue expansion and economies of scale and that less hatred would be created among the Afghani people.

Of course, some would argue that this plan could never be implemented considering Afghanistan’s frayed institutions. Although this seems intuitively true, however, there are several creative ways around this. When the Taliban cracked down in 2000, they did so by holding tribal leaders accountable for their people’s behavior. Due to the close tribal ties within most of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, this implicit social check was extremely effective at ensuring regulations were followed. In addition, the ability of the government to hold legitimate(-ish) elections last year suggests nationwide administrative projects are at least possible.

A second possible objection is that illegal opium will always pay better, so no one will ever go the legal route. Yet although illegal opium may sell for more, legal opium has several crucial advantages for the average farmer. People are risk averse, and many would accept lower profits for a 0% chance of having their farm strafed by NATO planes. Additionally, allowing one to bring his business out into the open allows for investment and expansion in ways that are impossible when farming must be clandestine. Finally, farms that enter the legal sector would have their property protected by the state, which is obviously not true for illegal drugs. Thus, it seems likely that at least some people will choose to license if given the option, and perhaps even most.


likely license candidate


In the end, however, perfection is not necessary. The beauty of this plan is that even if only 5% of farmers buy in, everyone is better off. This seems like a win win, and when set against the monstrous policy challenges Afghanistan faces, it certainly seems like the least bad option. Keep it real, DER