
thoughts on the long war
For this, the first post of the new posting season, I am going to talk about homeland security. The inspiration for this particular post came (unsurprisingly) from a mildly unpleasant airport experience. While most of the time the war on terror seems intangible and nebulous in the realm of the airport it is very, very real. My story begins when I was randomly drawn from the security cue to have my luggage inspected. After a brief search, the authorities discovered that I was transporting two illegal items, namely a can of Red Bull and a tube of Crest toothpaste. After being admonished I was allowed to leave under the condition that I left both items behind.
Of course, I remember a time when toothpaste was rarely associated with
international terrorism (terrorists generally aren't huge on dental hygiene). Yet as a result of a blot last summer to destroy more than a dozen jetliners using liquid based explosive, new regulations were passed banning the transport of all liquids on flights with the exception of breast milk or other vital necessities. But then something changed. In an effort to address complaints that such regulations made flying onerous and needlessly difficult, the FAA released a new code known as 3-1-1, whereby fluids could be transported provided they were under 3 ounces and were in a ziploc bag. Put another way, had my toothpaste been in a smaller containers, it would be considered safe for flight. The theory is that 3 ounces is too small an amount to be explosive. Fair enough. But as the FAA states , " You are not limited in the amount or volume of these above items you may bring in your carry-on baggage." Meaning, in other words, that a policy costing millions of dollars in lost time and items will keep us safe ONLY SO LONG AS terrorists are too lazy to use several smaller containers and combine them in flight. If I were a terrorist, I'd do just that.
toothpaste negative; scanning for floss
Except if I were a terrorist, I wouldn't even bother with liquid explosives to bring down a plane. Instead, I would strap myself with an explosive belt and blow myself up in the lobby of Newark or the baggage claim of O'Hare or any other airport space that is both packed with people and can be entered without any security checkpoints. Then the billions spent each year on scanning technology would be completely circumvented, and hundreds could be killed.
Except if I were a terrorist, I wouldn't even bother with an airport. Airports are filled with alert citizens, law enforcement who may get lucky, and security cameras. No, what I would really do is have one of my mujaheddin into a crowded shopping mall or movie theatre with an explosive belt in a random suburb of America once every two weeks, indefinitely. Within 2 months the American economy would be in ruins, the American people would be paralyzed with fear, and the American government would be rushing to repeal the freedoms I as a terrorist would passionately loathe as fast as congressionally possible.
Except if I were a terrorist, I may not even bother with the explosive belt. After all, explosive belts often malfunction and can sometimes be tracked. Plus, while US border guards can't stop millions of farm workers from entering the nation, they may,may get lucky and find said explosives as they did in the foiled New Year's plot a few years back. So instead, I would have my jihadis obtain rifles within the US from the gigantic black market for guns and then have them act as snipers throughout large swathes of America, killing at random near shopping centers, parks, and schools. If the havoc and terror sown by John Lee Malvo during 2002 is any guide, such a strategy could paralyze America's society and economy at almost no cost and with almost no chance for authorities to act.
Except if I were a terrorist, I may not even both with trained snipers. Trained snipers are useful; far better to use them ambushing US troops in Iraq. Instead, I would simply acquire one of the thousands of illegally purchased AK 47s that permeate the black market, enter a crowded public space, and fire at random. Thus with no training, illegal border crossing, or smuggling of weapons, I could kill dozens and strike the beating heart of America where they live and work.
Of course, I have no experience planning terrorist attacks. I am no strategic mastermind or religious zealot; I am merely an airport traveler whose toothpaste was confiscated by the TSA. But although I lack expertise, I'm more sure than not that the roadmap I've just laid down would, in all likelihood, succeed.
There are tremendous ramifications. The first is that no matter how much we throw into security, it is almost impossible to purchase immunity from terrorism. Even if airports were made unassailable, we would still not be safe until every single public and private space in America were somehow protected 24/7. This is impossible. To see this we need look no further than Israel, a nation that is far smaller than the US and has far better border control and is still vulnerable to terrorism (though normative judgements aside the security barrier has helped). What this means is that at a certain point, no matter how much we invest into national protection, we can never actually be entirely safe. 100% of our discretionary funds would be insufficient to secure every theatre, club, school, roadway, seaport, airport, and government installation in America. Simply put, given contemporary capabilities we cannot afford to be totally safe.
This leads to several policy conclusions. The first is that we ought to emphasize the development of new technologies that could bring down the cost or increase the range of security devices. Such research would allow more security for the same price and could also have spillover effects on other sectors. The second is that we will be attacked again, since when one compares the huge size and tremendous freedoms of our society against the fierce hatred of our enemies they find our society to be at a crippling disadvantage.
But everyone loves investing in technology, and I would guess that most of us believe at some level that we will someday be struck again. The real conclusion, however, is that at a certain point national security is a good like any other that must be balanced against others. Today national security is considered so important that we often overlook the cost benefit analysis applied to almost any other policy realm. If a decision can be seen to even tangentially make us safer, we accept it without concern for the cost. One reason for this is political; as terrorism create infinite vulnerabilities it is exceedingly easy to produce a campaign commercial solemnly declaring that "Candidate X failed to protect American (ports/roads/bridges) from terrorists". But another part of this is visceral; we do not like to believe that there is a price too high for safety.
The truth, however, is that the craft of public policy constantly makes implicit judgements as to the value of safety against other goals. Speed limits are chosen to balance efficiency with safety, with their authors knowing full well that more people will die at 65 mph than at 45. Medicare and Medicaid budgets are slashed or augmented with the implicit knowledge that lives hang in the balance. Workplace safety regulations are released by the department of labor not to eliminate risk but to balance it at a level deemed acceptable. Faced with infinite threats, then, we must make the difficult discovery that protection from terrorism is an important goal for our society, but just one among many. Such a realization would mean the end of protections like 3-1-1, rules that cost millions of dollars and thousands of hours in hopes that terrorists will be smart enough to create liquid explosives and dumb enough to carry them in 4 ounce containers. Instead, we need to acknowledge that it's okay to balance our interests and, if necessary, cut down upon the bloated bureaucracy homeland security has become. 3-1-1 and its ilk are well intentioned, but faced with infinite hazards they are the wrong strategic choice to make in pursuing an effective society in the age of terrorism.
a threat unworthy of pursuit
Disclaimer: The column "If I were a terrorist" is NOT intended as an endorsement of terrorism, fundamentalism, or acts of violence against the US or any other nation. Please don't sue me.
Monday, January 29, 2007
If I Were a Terrorist...
Labels:
airports,
Homeland Security,
national security,
public policy,
terrorism,
TSA
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1 comments:
Although it is clear that certain security measures,(namely the US prohibition of Herbal Essences in Flight)are not effective means to completely remove the threat of terrorism...is that really what they are there for? I doubt the average remotely informed citizen truly believes that a few extra hours in the airplane terminal will prevent a suicide bomber from detonating himself on a subway train. What it does offer though is the comforting illusion of security and slight detachment from the seeming hopelessness of a sustained War on Terror.
In New York City, I ride either the subway or the Metro-North every day. The London tube bombings and the Madrid train attack are never far from my mind. The fear is present, primarily because of how easy it would be to carry out such an attack. Literally there are hundreds of hobos "Guiliani's Chosen People", passing through the subway stations with SHOPPING CARTS of suitcases and ominous large black hefty bags. Sure they probably have soda cans in them, but the potential for lethality is still there.
"The Tao of Homeland Security": A Philosophical Call to Turn Terrorism Into A Manageable Harm. by John T. Gordon (In bookstores, Fall of 2014)
Glad to see that Boundless has returned and congratulations on you're recent promotion to the rather presitgious, FBI list of suspicious persons.
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